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Abstract 
After briefly reviewing the new institutionalism, this article uses the history of political 
reform in Africa to test its key tenet: that power, if properly organized, is a productive 
resource.  It does so by exploring the relationship between changes in political 
institutions and changes in economic performance, both at the macro- and the micro- 
level.  The evidence indicates that political reform (Granger) causes increases in GDP per 
capita in the African subset of global data.  And, at the micro-level, it demonstrates that 
changes in national political institutions in Africa strongly relate to changes in total factor 
productivity in agriculture.   Page 2 
 
1. Introduction 
This article proceeds in several stages.  Section 2 provides an overview of the new institutionalism and 
reviews recent changes in the politics and economics of Africa.  Sections 3 and 4 then makes use of the 
data supplied by Africa’s efforts at political reform to address a core issue in the new institutionalism: the 
relationship between democracy and development.  At both the macro- and the micro-level, we find, the 
evidence supports institutionalist arguments: variation in political institutions bears a systematic, 
significant and plausibly causal relationship to variation in economic performance. 
2. Background 
 
2.A The Approach 
To introduce the new institutionalism, it is useful to juxtapose it against public choice 
theory – an approach which it has largely eclipsed.  The contrast between the two schools 
highlights the new institutinalist’s core argument: that political power can be socially 
productive.   
 
As do others (Hirshleifer 1994), public choice theorists identify two routes to the 
accumulation of wealth. One is production and exchange in markets and the other the use 
of power in politics.  In markets, they argue, no one needs consent to an exchange that 
renders him worse off.  Insofar as the pursuit of wealth takes place within markets, then, 
it is compatible with the social welfare (Buchanan 1989).  In political settings, by 
contrast, power can be marshaled to elicit involuntary transfers.  This is true when 
political institutions underpin despots, of course; but, Buchanan and others argue (e.g. Page 3 
Buchanan and Tullock 1962), it is also true in democracies, where political majorities can 
expropriate minorities and where concentrated minorities, for their part, can use public 
power to extract private benefits while distributing the costs widely.  The public choice 
school thus views power as a threat to social welfare. 
 
Contrast this argument with that of the new institutionalists (e.g. North and Thomas 
1973; North 1981; North 1990).  While conceding that indeed power can destroy wealth, 
they also insist that it can promote its creation.  Highlighting the pervasiveness of market 
failure, they note that political sanctions can be structured so as to strengthen the forces 
of production.  Tort law weakens incentives for non-performance, for example, making 
possible agreements that previously would have been shunned.  And governments can 
enforce property rights in ways that align private interests with the social welfare in 
situations that might otherwise have led to opportunistic – and self-defeating—behavior.  
Whereas the public choice school emphasized the use of coercion to impose involuntary 
losses, the new institutionalists thus emphasize its use to facilitate social gains.  They 
view political institutions as a form of capital that, if properly configured, can unleash the 
productive potential of the economy, making economic growth possible (Bates, Greif et 
al. 2002). 
 
In search of evidence for such arguments, the new institutionalism has pursued several 
lines of inquiry.  Of particular relevance to Africa is research into the relationship 
between democracy and development. 
 Page 4 
Writing in 1959, Seymour Martin Lipset reported a strong and positive correlation 
between income per capita and democracy in a global cross section of nations (Lipset 
1959).  Economic development, he argued, leads to democracy.  Lipset’s work thus 
anticipated a major portion of the contemporary agenda in the new institutionalism.
1   
 
Lipset’s finding invites a dynamic and causal interpretation.  It was therefore startling 
that when estimating Markov transition models Przeworski et al. (2000) failed to find a 
significant relationship between the level of income per capita and the likelihood of a 
transition to democracy.  While Boix and Stokes (2003) and Epstein, Bates et al. (2006) 
have challenged Przeworski et al.’s finding, it has subsequently been replicated by 
Acemoglu, Johnson et al. (2008).
2  
 
Beginning in the 1980s, political forces from within Africa and without engineered 
sweeping political changes, introducing democratic institutions into what had been 
authoritarian settings.  Among their objectives was to secure institutional reform and to 
reignite growth in Africa’s stagnant economies.  Late-century Africa thus, in effect, 
offers an experiment that empowers us to evaluate institutionalist arguments.  
 
                                                 
1 See the contributions to Helpman, E., Ed. (2008). Institutions and Economic Performance. Princeton NJ, 
Princeton University Press.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠThe portions of this essay devoted to the Lipset hypothesis draw heavily from Fayad, G., et al. (2011). 
Income and Democracy: Lipset's Law Inverted. OxCarre Research Paper 61. Oxford, Oxford Center for the 
Analysis of Research Rich Economies.  Those devoted to agriculture draw heavily draw from Bates, R. H. 
and  S.  Block  (2010).  Revisiting  African  Agriculture:  Institutional  Change  and  Productivity  Growth. 
Cambridge MA, Weatherhead Center.	 ﾠPage 5 
2.B The Case of Africa 
As documented in academic studies (Ndulu, O'Connell et al. 2008) and official reports 
(World Bank 1991), those addressing Africa’s poor economic performance in the post-
independence period traced its roots to Africa’s political systems.  Overwhelmingly 
single party or military regimes, (see Figure 1), they were narrowly based, resting on a 
coalition composed of urban-based, public-sector employees, manufacturers, and 
industrial firms.  As best summarized in (Ndulu, O'Connell et al. 2008), the economic 
policies of many of these regimes were characterized (inter alia) by: 
 
•  Tariff policies that protected domestic manufacturing (but not agriculture). 
•  Industrial regulations that conferred market power on the producers of 
manufactured goods but on the purchasers of agricultural products. 
•  Over-valuation of domestic currencies. 
 
Given that manufacturing received tariff protection from imports, while agriculture did 
not, the last of these measures further tilted relative prices in favor of the urban sector.   
 
Taken together, these policies shifted relative prices against agriculture – the largest 
single sector of most of Africa’s economies.  One result was slower growth, as incentives 
eroded for persons to invest capital or labor power in farming.
3  Given that agricultural 
                                                 
3	 ﾠAs reported in Ndulu, B. J., S. A. O'Connell, et al. (2008). The Political Economy of Economic Growth in 
Africa, 1960-2000. New York, Cambridge University Press, the adoption of these policies (which, taken 
together, they call “control regimes”) imposed a loss of nearly two percentage points to the annual rate of 
growth.  	 ﾠPage 6 
exports generated a significant portion of Africa’s earnings in foreign markets, another 
was external debt.   
 
Although international donors pressured Africa’s governments for policy reform, the 
governments were reluctant to comply.  As authoritarian regimes, they were based on a 
narrow set of organized interests and the fortunes of each depended to a significant extent 
upon government policies.  While Africa’s farmers stood to benefit from policy reform, 
they lay widely scattered, resided in culturally distinctive communities, and therefore 
found it difficult to organize.  As the logic of collective action (Olson 1985, Bates 1981, 
Becker 1983) would suggest, the urban coalition – highly concentrated spatially and 
economically -- therefore prevailed, and this mix of policies remained in place despite its 
economic costs.   
 
Recognizing the political forces at play, those who sought to alter government policies 
and thereby secure the renewal of economic growth in Africa sought to alter Africa’s 
political institutions.  They sought thereby to alter political incentives so that politicians 
would no longer regard such policies as politically winning.  In particular, they 
recognized that should Africa’s rural dwellers once again be able to vote, then, given 
their numbers, their interests, and their presence in numerous electoral districts, they 
could render policies that damaged the fortunes of farming politically unsustainable.  In 
pursuit of policy reform, Africa’s creditors abroad therefore joined domestic reformers at 
home in demanding a return to open political competition and majority rule. 
 Page 7 
As discussed by Dunning (2004), until the late 1980s, the Cold War initially kept external 
pressures in check.  Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, foreign 
ministries in the West were less inclined to stay the hand of finance ministries, and the 
latter enjoyed far greater latitude in their negotiations with debtor governments.  
Financial institutions were now free openly to act in concert with domestic reformers.  In 
the absence of political reform, they could – and did – suspend further lending.  In pursuit 
of foreign capital, Africa’s governments capitulated, conceding the right to form 
opposition parties that could compete for votes (see Figure 1).  The change in institutions 
enfranchised Africa’s rural population.   
 
These changes were inherently valuable; for social scientists, moreover, they offered an 
opportunity to observe and to measure the relationship between political change and 
changes in economic performance.  Focusing on the Lipset hypothesis, section 3 relates 
political reform in Africa to the growth of national incomes.  Section 4 relates political 
change to changes in total factor productivity in agriculture.  Both report evidence 
supportive of institutionalist arguments. 
3. Institutions and Development 
We begin with the work of Fayad, G., et al. (2011), who have conducted the most recent 
investigation of the Lipset hypothesis.  Fayad et al. themselves target the work of 
Acemoglu, Johnson, et al. (2008) (henceforth AJRY), who had concluded that Lipset was 
wrong.  Using a variety of estimators and including fixed effects, AJRY found that, pace 
Lipset, there was no relationship between GDP per capita and democracy in global 
samples, 1960-2000.  Fayad, G., et al. (2011) concur with Grundlach and Paldam’s Page 8 
(2009) critique of AJRY, arguing that by applying estimators which assumes cross 
sectional parameter homogeneity while including annual and country fixed effects, AJRY 
purge from their panels useful information, thereby predisposing them to fail in their 
search for a relationship between income and democracy.  Fayad G.,  et al. (2011) instead 
employ an augmented version of the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran, 
Shin, and Smith 1999) which relaxes the assumption of cross-sectional parameter 
homogeneity.  They thereby gain access to variation unavailable to AJRY, and in doing 
so detect a statistically significant relationship between institutions and economic 
performance that had eluded AJRY. 
 
The PMG estimator allows intercepts, slope coefficients and error variances to differ 
across panel members. More specifically, it allows the short-run coefficients to vary 
across countries, while restricting long-run relationships to be homogeneous.
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The model they estimate is: 
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4	 ﾠIn the context of this research, the estimator in effect “assumes” that in the short run – or while adjusting 
to a common long-run equilibrium – each country’s political institutions respond differently to income 
shocks.	 ﾠPage 9 
averages.  Crucially, the error term  it ε  is identically and independently distributed across i 
and t even in the presence of common time effects. Country intercepts -- unobserved 
country heterogeneity – are captured by the term  i µ .  
 
The second part of equation (1) includes the lagged changes of income and democracy; 
the coefficients represent the short-run adjustment terms and are assumed to vary across 
countries. We do not report the short-run coefficients below. The first part of equation (1) 
captures the common long-run relationship between income and democracy. The slope 
coefficients -- β,η, and α  -- measure the long-run response of democracy to income, 
world income and world democracy. ϕ is the error correction coefficient and indicates 
the speed of adjustment  If the system is dynamically stable and converges to a long-run 
equilibrium, then this coefficient will be negative and less than one in absolute value.  
We report these long-run coefficients below. 
 
Fayad G., et al. (2011) apply this model to a panel of 105 countries spanning the years 
1960-2000.  As did AJRY, Fayad G., et al. (2011) employ the Polity IV democracy 
index
5 and the Penn World Tables' (PWT 6.3) chain weighted estimates of real GDP per 
capita income.  When they estimate the relationship between democracy and income 
from pooled data using OLS, they – as did AJRY -- find the coefficient on the income 
variable to be positive and significant.  And when they include time and country fixed 
effects, they – as did AJRY -- find that the coefficient does not significantly differ from 
                                                 
5	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhich distributes over a range spanning the interval between perfect autocracies (score of -10) and 
perfect democracies (score of 10).	 ﾠPage 10 
zero
6.  But when Fayad, G., et al. (2011) employ the pooled mean group estimator, they 
find the coefficient significant and negative.  Fayad, G., et al. (2011) confirm that 
differences in the samples do not account for differences in the estimates.  Rather, they 
conclude, the difference arises from differences in their choice of estimator. 
 
3.A Principal Findings 
The major results derived from this model appear in the first column of Table 1, while 
estimates derived from the mean group estimator appear in the second.  The Hausman 
test in column 3 result testifies to the validity of the long-run homogeneity restrictions 
imposed by the PMG estimator.
7 The coefficients generated by the pooled mean 
estimator suggest that income is negatively and significantly related to democracy.  
Given that the model is linear log, they suggest that a 10% increase in per capita income 
leads in the long run to a roughly 0.12 unit decrease in the polity scale.  
 
Proceeding further, Fayad G., et al. (2011) disaggregate their sample.  They then find 
significant regional differences in the relationship between income and democracy.  They 
find that while running both ways in the global sample, in the Africa subsample, Granger 
causality runs from democrcy to income (Table 2) and that the relationship is 
                                                 
6 Because it allows for heterogeneous intercepts, the PMG estimator can incorporate country-specific fixed 
effects.  But because it estimates the model for each country separately, it can not allow the inclusion of 
year fixed effects.  To correct for potential cross-section dependence in the estimated errors, Fayad G., et 
al. (2011) – as do Binder and Offermanns (2007) – therefore augment the model with the cross-sectional 
averages of the dependent variable and regressors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠMore precisely, the difference between both MG and PMG estimators is used to compute a Hausman-type 
statistic.	 ﾠPage 11 
significantly positive.  As can be seen in Table 3, in Sub-Saharan Africa, a one unit 
increases in the Polity score is associated with a 1.5% increase in income per capita.
8 
 
Institutional change in Africa thus associates with changes in incomes.
 9  Political reform 
in Africa appears to have generated evidence that supports the arguments of both 
reformers and scholars alike and produced higher incomes for Africa’s impoverished 
economies.
10   
 
Recent political developments suggest that these gains are under threat, however.  While 
“17 countries are leading the way” (Radelet, 2010), a sumber seem to be  backsliding. 
Over the past decade, there have been seven successful coups and a further six failed 
attempts. Over the same period, according to the Ibrahim Index, in 15 countries, 
governance failed to improve
11, while, according to The African President’s Index , in 22, 
leadership was extremely poor.
12   Political incumbents in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Chad, Senegal and Uganda successfully altered their constitutions in order to allow them 
to compete yet again for the presidency (see Posner and Young, 2007); in each instance, 
                                                 
8	 ﾠThe Hausman test in column 3 result testifies to the validity of the long-run homogeneity restrictions 
imposed by the PMG estimator.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠThis conclusion finds additional support in the report by Radelet, S. (2010). Emerging Africa: How 17 
Countries Are Leading the Way. Washington DC, Center for Global Development.  See also Fosu, A. K. 
(2008). "Democracy and Growth: Implications of Increasing Electoral Competiveness." Economic Letters 
100(September): 442-444.	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠThis conclusion finds additional support in the report by Radelet, S. (2010). Emerging Africa: How 17 
Countries Are Leading the Way. Washington DC, Center for Global Development.  See also Fosu, A. K. 
(2008). "Democracy and Growth: Implications of Increasing Electoral Competiveness." Economic Letters 
100(September):  442-444  and  Nkurunziza,  J.  D.  and  R.  H.  Bates  (2003).  Political  Institutions  and 
Economic  Growth  in  Africa.  CID  Working  Paper  No.  98.  Cambridge  MA,  Center  for  International 
Development, Harvard University. 
11	 ﾠ Own	 ﾠ calculations	 ﾠ based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Ibrahim	 ﾠ Index	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Governance	 ﾠ
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-index (accessed 18 Dec. 2010)	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠThe African Presidents Index: The good, the bad and the ugly. The East African.	 ﾠNairobi. December 27, 
2010 - January 2, 2011. Page 12 
the incumbents won and remained in office. Clearly, institutional reform remains work in 
progress. 
4. Evidence from the Micro- Level 
The evidence thus far has come from the macro- level:  It consists of relationships 
between political institutions and measures of the total economic product.  But recall the 
argument advanced in the introduction, which appealed to the utility functions and policy 
preferences of politicians, to the structure of political competition, and, in particular, to 
changes in the composition of the electorate resulting from the enfranchisement of 
farmers.  In the section that follows, we draw upon these finer features of the polity and 
upon micro-level data on the economy to explore once again the relationship between 
political institutions and economic performance. 
4.A Total Factor Productivity 
 
In a recent paper, Steven Block (2010) combined data from 44 countries over 46 years 
(1961-2007) to generate estimates of changes in total factor productivity in African 
agriculture.  In the initial years of independence, he found, total factor productivity 
dramatically declined.  In the early 1980s, however, it began to grow.  And by the early 
2000s, its average annual rate of growth was over four times faster than it had been 25 
years earlier.  His estimates suggest that the average rate of TFP growth in the baseline 
estimate is 0.97% per year, a figure that falls to 0.87% per year when we adjust for land 
quality and to 0.59% per year when we include adjustments for the quality of labor.  For 
our purposes, however, the key finding is the post-independence decline and subsequent 
rise of cross-country agricultural productivity growth in Africa, which give rise to two Page 13 
questions.  Did changes in Africa’s political institutions bear a systematic relationship to 
changes in the performance of Africa’s rural economy?  And, if so, through what 
mechanism did their impact run?  We argue that they did, both directly and through their 
impact on government policies. 
4A. The Data 
Using aggregate crop output figures for each country, and Africa-specific prices and PPP 
exchange rates,
13 Block derives his estimates from a semi-parametric specification of a  
constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglass production function:  
(1)  
	 ﾠ
where yi(t) is aggregate crop output for country i in year t, xij(t) is a vector of j 
conventional agricultural inputs (land, chemical fertilizer, tractors, and livestock); zij(t) 
are quality shifters associated with these inputs (average years of schooling to adjust 
labor quality, as well as rainfall and irrigated land share to adjust for the quality of land); 
pij(t) are other potential explanations for TFP growth (to include political competition); 
TD are annual time dummies; and CD are country dummies.  All variables are in logs, 
normalized by the size of the labor force in agriculture. 
 
                                                 
13	 ﾠBlock (2010) constructs these aggregates from crop-specific output data published by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the UN.  Other studies simply employ the FAO’s pre-constructed  output 
aggregates, which are based on global prices and exchange rates.  Block’s estimates thus more closely 
reflect the circumstances actually faced by Africa’s farmers.	 ﾠPage 14 
To derive the country-specific rates of agricultural TFP growth , he estimates equation (1) 
country-by-country.  The “baseline” estimates (shown in the cross-country aggregates in 
Figure 2) exclude the adjustments for input quality contained in the vector z.  He then re-
estimates the function while adjusting for land quality (by controlling for the effect of 
annual rainfall and irrigated land share), and then re-estimates it once again while 
adjusting as well for labor quality (by controlling for average years of schooling).  While 
the estimate of TFP growth is reduced by the extent to which those additional variables 
“explain” the initial baseline estimate, the adjustments help to differentiate between 
productivity increases resulting from the use of improved inputs from those that result 
from increases in the efficiency with which these inputs are employed.   
 
We seek to relate these changes in total factor productivity to changes in political 
institutions.  As a measure of institutions, we make use of a scale that provides a measure 
of the degree of political competition that the incumbent chief executive faced when 
coming to office.
 14  For each country in each year, the scale assigns a number that 
indicates whether: 
1 -- No executive exists. 
2 – An executive exists but was not elected. 
3 – The executive was elected, but was the sole candidate. 
4 – The executive was elected, with multiple candidates competing for the office. 
5 -- Multiple parties were also able to contest the executive elections. 
                                                 
14	 ﾠThe measure is taken from the World Bank’s Data Base of Political Institutions: Beck, T., G. Clarke, et 
al.  (2001).  "New  Tools  and  New  Tests  in  Comparative  Political  Economy:  The  Database  of  Political 
Institutions." World Bank Economic Review. The measure was devised by the Africa Research Program at 
Harvard, who established that it yields a cumulative (Guttman) scale.  See Bates, R. H., K. Ferree, et al. 
(1996). Toward the Systematic Study of Transitions. Development Discussion Paper No. 256. Cambridge 
MA, Harvard Institute for International Development.	 ﾠPage 15 
6 -- Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, and the 
winner won more than 75% of the votes.  
7 -- Candidates from more than one party competed in executive elections, and the 
winner won less than 75% of the vote. 
 
We employ as our measure a dummy variable, named “electoral competition,” that takes 
the value 1 when a government is rated 6 or above and 0 otherwise.   
 
When discussing public policy, we employ two measures.  One is the black market 
premium (BMP) for foreign exchange.  While the BMP is a direct measure of exchange 
rate misalignment, we follow Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) who view BMP as a proxy 
for broader distortions in macroeconomic policy.   
 
Our second policy indicator is the nominal rate of assistance to agricultural importables, a 
sectoral indicator of trade policy intervention, which we take from the World Bank’s 
database on Distortions to Agricultural Incentives (Anderson 2009).  When an ad 
valorem tariff is the sole policy intervention for good (x), the nominal rate of assistance 
for commodity x is: 
(3)  m
m
x t
P E
P E t P E
NRA =
∗
∗ − + ∗
=
) 1 (
 
where tm  is tariff rate, E is the nominal exchange rate, and P is the dollar-denominated 
world price of the commodity.  The nominal rates of assistance for individual crops may 
be aggregated to form the nominal rate of assistance for agricultural importables 
(NRA_totm), which are typically foodgrains.  Food imports compete with the product of Page 16 
Africa’s famers for the domestic market and the NRA_totm therefore determines the 
prices at which local producers can sell what they grow.  It also influences the 
distribution of income, as the lower prices that reduce the incomes of rural producers 
enhance the purchasing power of urban consumers.  It follows from our central line of 
reasoning that the enfranchisement of the rural majority should be associated with 
decreased assistance for competing agricultural imports.   
 
The Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA) is calculated as:  
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where NRAag/nonag represents an aggregate index of the commodity-specific NRAs for the 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of each country. The RRA provides a measure of 
the relative level of protection conferred upon agricultural and non-agricultural 
(manufactured) goods.  When agriculture is relatively favored by trade, the RRA is 
greater than one; when disfavored, it is less.  The RRA therefore provides a measure of 
“urban bias”. 
 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for these data. 
4.B. Bivariate Relations 
To motivate the analysis that follows, we introduce Figure 3, which distinguishes the 
time path of TFP growth rates in observations with and without electoral competition
15.  
                                                 
15	 ﾠNet of adjustments for input quality.	 ﾠPage 17 
The TFP growth rate in settings characterized by electoral competition progressively 
diverges from the TFP growth rate in settings that lacked it.  On average, countries with 
electoral competition experienced agricultural TFP growth of 1.04% per year, while the 
average rate was only 0.48% per year in countries without.
16   
 
We also introduce Figure 4, which compares government policies in country-years with 
and without electoral competition.  Each panel in Figure 4 contains a box that depicts the 
portion of the observations of a variable that fall within the interquartile range, i.e. those 
whose values place them between the lower 25% and the upper 25% of the range of the 
values of the variable.  The horizontal lines within the boxes mark the variable’s median 
value.  The upper and lower horizontal lines laying outside the boxes mark the upper and 
lower values of the data. 
 
The data suggest that governments headed by an executive chosen in a competitive 
election not only spend more on agricultural research, secure higher levels of educational 
attainment, and pave a larger percentage of their roads.  The data also suggest that they 
exercise greater fiscal and monetary restraint than do their authoritarian counterparts (as 
indicated by the virtual absence of black markets for their currencies) and intervene in 
markets in ways less likely to shift relative prices against farmers (as indicated by their 
relative rates of assistance).  Calculating the means, we apply one-sided t-tests to the 
differences and find each to be significant and in the expected direction.  Governments in 
competitive political systems adopt policies that lower the costs, increase the earnings, 
and strengthen the incentives for farmers.   
                                                 
16	 ﾠThese averages are statistically different in a two-sided t-test (P = 0.0014).	 ﾠPage 18 
 
In the estimates we develop below, we focus in particular on the nominal rate of 
assistance to agricultural importables.  In Figure 5, we superimpose a smoothed version 
of the mean RRA over the TFP growth profiles.  The Figure underscores that TFP growth 
declined when urban bias was increasing and increased when urban bias was decreasing.  
The difference in the mean growth rates is statistically different at greater than the .01-
level. 
 
To probe deeper and more rigorously, we turn to multivariate analysis. 
4.C. A Deeper Look 
 
Tables 5-7 provide both the structure of and evidence for our argument.  They report the 
total effect of institutional reform on the growth of total factor productivity in agriculture; 
the mediated effect, i.e. its impact on policies that themselves affect TFP growth; and the 
direct effect (McKinnon 2008; Imai, Keele, et. al., 2010).  Given that political reform and 
the growth of total factor productivity in agriculture could be the joint products of 
variables excluded from the analysis, in each table, we introduce country fixed effects to 
account (at least) for the time-invariant unobservable characteristics.
17  And because of 
                                                 
17	 ﾠBlock (2010), among others, found that expenditures on agricultural R&D explain a substantial share of 
TFP growth, and our illustrative result in Figure 4 indicates that spending on R&D is higher in settings with 
electoral  competition.    Thus,  we  must  be  concerned  that  excluding  R&D  expenditures  from  our 
specification, which we are forced to do by the lack of a sufficiently large common sample,  introduces 
potential bias into our estimates of the effect of electoral competition on TFP. However, the magnitude of 
any potential bias is a direct function of the correlation between (excluded) R&D and (included) electoral 
competition. The simple correlation between R&D expenditures and EIEC is low (0.11) and the R-squared 
in a fixed-effects regression of (log) R&D on our electoral competition dummy is essentially zero (0.0008). 
These considerations suggest that excluding R&D from our specifications does not significantly influence 
our finding for electoral competition.  In addition, virtually all of the variation in R&D is “between” rather 
than “within” variation (the between coefficient of variation is nearly 4 times greater than the within), 
suggesting that country dummies absorb nearly all of the variation in R&D.	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the possibility of reciprocal causality in the relationship between political reform and 
productivity growth, we also make use of instrumental variables, introducing the level of 
political competition in neighboring states (lagged by one year) and the end of the Cold 
War as excluded instruments in a fixed effects two-stage least squares estimator.   
 
Table 5 presents estimates of the total effect of institutional change on the rate of growth 
of total agricultural productivity in Africa 1961-2007.  Columns 1 and 2 address the basic 
relationship between electoral competition and agricultural TFP growth.  Controlling 
only for a year trend and country fixed effects, we find that electoral competition 
increases TFP growth by about 0.7 percentage points.  Instrumenting -- as described 
above -- for electoral competition increases this point estimate by approximately one 
percentage point (column 2).
 18  We introduce additional controls, seeking to take into 
account the impact of Africa’s endemic civil conflicts and the share of its rural 
population.  These controls enter (individually in columns 3 and 4, and together in 
column 5) with the expected signs and have no impact on our estimated effect of electoral 
competition on agricultural TFP growth.  In column 6 we deepen our analysis by 
including the interaction between our dummy for electoral competition and the rural 
population share.  We hypothesize that if outcomes favorable to agriculture are more 
likely when policymakers face electoral competition, then the magnitude of the effect 
should itself be a positive function of the rural population share.  The results in column 5 
are therefore suggestive: the point estimates increase with the rural population share.  
They are not statistically different from one another, however.  
                                                 
18	 ﾠThe Cragg-Donald F-tests of excluded instruments uniformly support the strength of our instruments, and 
the  Sargan-Hansen  J  statistic  uniformly  fails  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  instruments  are 
exogenous.	 ﾠPage 20 
 
In Table 6, we explore the impact of institutions on policy choice, which we view as 
mediating between the introduction of political competition and growth of total factor 
productivity.  We assess the effect of electoral competition on the two policy variables – 
RRA (in columns 1 and 2) and BMP (in columns 3 and 4).  In both sets of equations, we 
allow the effect of electoral competition to vary as a function of the rural population 
share; and we estimate each model by both fixed effects and fixed effects two-stage least 
squares using the identification strategy outlined above.  
 
The coefficients in column 1 confirm that the magnitude of the relationship between 
institutional change and policy choice is a function of the size of the rural electorate: the 
greater the portion of the total population that lives in rural areas, the greater the 
reduction in urban bias (e.g., the higher or less negative the RRA) when governments 
must compete for votes.  Column 2 corrects for the potential endogeneity of electoral 
competition and confirms that more favorable treatment is given farmers by governments 
that must compete for votes to secure public office.  We also find (in columns 3 and 4) 
that electoral competition reduces the black market premium. 
 
In Table 7, we estimate the direct and indirect impact of institutional change by adding 
our mediating policy variables, RRA and BMP, to the specification from Table 5.  In 
columns 1 and 3, respectively, we first measure the total impact (for the available sample 
set of observations) of electoral competition by excluding each policy variable.  In 
columns 2 and 4, we then add the policy variables.  The change in the point estimate for Page 21 
electoral competition when the policy variable is added provides an estimate of the extent 
to which electoral competition operates through its impact on the policy variable. 
 
Comparing the point estimates for electoral competition in columns 1 and 2, we find little 
effect of including RRA.  This suggests that while RRA is influenced by electoral 
competition, most of total effect of electoral competition is direct; it runs through 
channels other than its impact on relative prices.  Columns 3 and 4 suggest that some of 
the effect of electoral competition on agricultural TFP growth may operate through 
improved macroeconomic policy.  The estimated coefficient on electoral competition is 
reduced by the inclusion of black market premium, though the difference in the point 
estimates for electoral competition in columns 3 and 4 is not statistically significant.
19  
 
Electoral competition thus leads directly to an increase in the growth rate of agricultural 
TFP growth on the order of one percentage point.  We can only speculate on the channels 
through which it does so.  Mechanisms that might be explored include the return of 
private agents to the rural economy, the reduced regulation of agricultural markets, 
improved rural infrastructure, and increased rural incomes as a result of greater 
government spending on roads and public facilities.  Electoral competition influences 
agricultural TFP indirectly as well.  Given that the majority of the electorate resides in 
rural areas, when competing for majorities at the polls, politiciansns now have strong 
incentives to adopt policies that increase the returns to farming.. 
                                                 
19 Here, too, we instrument for the existence of electoral competition.  Diagnostic tests support the strength 
of our instruments, though the tests of overidentifying restrictions in columns 3 and 4 suggest some concern 
for their exogeneity.  Given the weakness of this test, and that previous tests of similar models gave rise to 
no concerns, we report this finding, but do not consider it a threat to our argument.	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5. Conclusion 
The late century changes in Africa’s political institutions constituted a natural 
experiment, enabling scholars to test institutionalist arguments.  In this article, we have 
sought to take advantage of the data thus supplied.   
 
In Africa, we find, institutions bear a systematic and significant relationship to economic 
performance.  At the micro-level, political reform is (Granger) causally related to 
economic growth; and at the micro-level, positively and significantly related to TFP 
growth in agriculture.  The latter relationship is both direct and through its impact on 
government policies.  Given that Africa’s electorate is largely rural, the movement to 
majoritarian institutions led to the creation of an electorate dominated by farmers, thus 
weakening the governments’ commitment to policies favoring consumers at the expense 
of the producers of agricultural products. 
 
Our analysis of Africa’s “great experiment” thus suggests that the hopes of the late 
century reformers were fulfilled: changes in institutions led to changes in policy and to 
economic growth.  They also suggest that the new instituionalism is right: the rules that 
structure the use of power influence the performance of economies. 
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Figure 2.  Agricultural TFP Growth Rates Adjusted for Input Quality 
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Figure 3.  Agricultural TFP Growth Profile for Country-Years With and Without 
Electoral Competition 
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Figure 4: Policy Differences: With and Without Electoral Competition 
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Figure 5.  Effect of Nominal Rate of Assistance to Agricultural Importables on 
Agricultural TFP Growth 
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Table 1: Augmented PMG estimation; Overall sample (N=105); 1955-2007 
 
Dependent variable: Polity IV Measure of Democracy  
Long-run Coefficients  PMG 
1 
MG 
2 
Hausman Test 
3 
Log Income per Capita  -1.239***  0.390  1.44 
  (0.153)  (1.368)  [0.23] 
       
World Democracy   0.800***  0.926***  0.80 
  (0.029)  (0.143)  [0.37] 
     
World Output  3.059***  0.293  0.90 
  (0.547)  (2.958)  [0.34] 
     
  Joint Hausman test  2.39 
      [0.50] 
Error Correction Coefficient  -0.264***  -0.469***   
  (0.029)  (0.034)   
 
Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Numbers reported in 
parentheses are standard errors. Numbers reported in brackets are p-values.***, **, and * 
indicate significance respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. We use the Schwartz 
Bayesian optimal lag selection Criterion subject to a maximum lag of three. World 
democracy and world output are respectively the cross-sectional averages of democracy 
and output, which we take as proxies of the common unobserved global shocks. Page 31 
 
Table 2: Granger causality tests 
 
  Overall sample 
Null hypothesis 
 
  Observations  Lags  F-stat  Probability 
Democracy does not 
Granger cause income 
  4532 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
5.472 
  
0.001 
Income does not Granger 
cause democracy 
 
  4532  3  6.870  0.000 
    Sub-Saharan Africa sample 
Null hypothesis 
 
  Observation
s 
Lags  F-stat  Probability 
Democracy does not 
Granger cause income 
 
 
   
1741 
 
3 
 
2.574 
 
0.052 
Income does not Granger 
cause democracy 
 
   
1741 
 
3 
 
1.521 
 
0.207 
    Non-Sub-Saharan Africa sample 
Null hypothesis    Observation
s 
Lags  F-stat  Probability 
 
Democracy does not 
Granger cause income 
 
 
   
 
2791 
 
 
3 
 
 
2.612 
 
 
 
0.050 
Income does not Granger 
cause democracy 
 
   
2791 
 
3 
 
5.283 
 
0.001 
Note: In testing whether democracy Granger causes income, income is regressed on lags 
of income and democracy, and the reported F-stat is a Wald-type test of the joint 
significance of all estimated coefficients on such lags. We also report the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis. 
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Table 3: Augmented PMG estimation; Sub-Saharan Africa sample (N=42);  
1955-2007 
 
Dependent variable: Log of GDP per capita  
Long-run Coefficients  PMG  MG  Hausman Test 
Democracy  0.015***  0.081  1.46 
  (0.002)  (0.055)  [0.23] 
       
World Democracy   0.018***  -0.018  2.13 
  (0.003)  (0.025)  [0.14] 
     
World Output  1.176***  1.191***  0.00 
  (0.103)  (0.363)  [0.97] 
     
  Joint Hausman test  2.64 
      [0.45] 
Error Correction Coefficient  -0.122***  -0.259***   
  (0.030)  (0.034)   
Notes: All equations include a constant country-specific term. Numbers reported in 
parentheses are standard errors. Numbers reported in brackets are p-values.***, **, and * 
indicate significance respectively at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. We use the Schwartz 
Bayesian optimal lag selection Criterion subject to a maximum lag of three. World 
democracy and world output are respectively the cross-sectional averages of democracy 
and output, which we take as proxies of the common unobserved global shocks Page 33 
Table 4.  Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Source: 
             
Agricultural TFP Growth  1494  0.614  2.117  -7.694  8.247  Block (2010) 
Dummy=1 if Exec. Index of 
Electoral Competition >6  1460  0.427  0.495  0.000  1.000  Beck and Clarke (2009) 
Neighbors' Executive Index of 
Electoral Competition  1230  4.289  1.586  1.500  7.000  Based on Beck & Clarke (2009) 
Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA)  642  -0.279  0.299  -0.946  1.295  Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
Black Market Premium on Foreign 
Exchange  1321  1.361  3.436  -6.908  6.122  World Devt Indicators (2009) 
Civil War dummy  2162  0.166  0.372  0.000  1.000  Sambanis and Doyle (2006) 
Rural Population Share  2064  71.713  16.410  12.700  97.960  World Devt Indicators (2009) 
 
Countries for which we have estimates of agricultural TFP growth (boldface indicates the 
existence of data for RRA for that country):  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe. 
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Table 5.  Effect of Electoral Competition on Agricultural TFP Growth for Crop 
Agriculture in SSA  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  FE  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS 
             
Electoral Comp dummy  0.691*  1.670***  1.633***  1.945***  1.928***  1.414 
  (0.376)  (0.385)  (0.380)  (0.355)  (0.353)  (0.969) 
Year trend  0.0249  -0.00780  -0.00453  -
0.109*** 
-
0.106*** 
-
0.111*** 
  (0.0335)  (0.0145)  (0.0142)  (0.017)  (0.0167)  (0.0193) 
Civil War Dummy      -
0.440*** 
  -0.179  -0.174 
      (0.157)    (0.145)  (0.147) 
Rural Pop Shr        -
0.168*** 
-
0.165*** 
-
0.175*** 
        (0.014)  (0.0139)  (0.0232) 
EleComp x Rural Pop Shr            0.00799 
            (0.0146) 
Constant  -49.54           
  (66.47)           
             
Observations  635  635  635  635  635  635 
R-squared  0.116  0.049  0.066  0.211  0.215  0.206 
Number of countries  27  27  27  27  27  27 
             
Sargan-Hansen (P-value)    0.482  0.70  0.418  0.502  0.510 
Cragg-Donald Wald (F-stat)    53.29
a  53.80
a  52.00
a  52.38
a  29.94
a 
Partial Effect of Elecomp 
with rural pop share =  
           
   63% (25
th pctl)            1.90*** 
(0.356) 
   72% (50
th pctl)            1.98*** 
(0.376) 
   85% (75
th pctl)            2.08*** 
(0.475) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded instruments used 
in 1
st stage regressions:  lagged mean level of electoral competition in neighboring countries, 
dummy for Cold War (and interaction of rural population share with Cold War dummy  in 
column 6, only). 
a Exceeds 10% maximal IV size value for Stock-Yogo weak ID test. 
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Table 6.  Effect of Electoral Competition on RRA and Black Market Premium 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  FE  FE-2SLS  FE  FE-2SLS 
Dep Var:  RRA  Black Market Premium (log) 
         
Electoral Competition        
dummy 
-0.355  -1.067***  -2.089  -8.303*** 
(0.245)  (0.251)  (1.977)  (2.568) 
Rural Pop. Share  -0.0130  -0.0188***  0.278***  0.143*** 
  (0.00773)  (0.00419)  (0.0588)  (0.0397) 
EleComp dummy x Rural 
Pop. Share 
0.00685*  0.0169***  -0.0135  0.0307 
(0.00340)  (0.00330)  (0.0261)  (0.0337) 
Civil War dummy  -0.0237  -0.0174  1.239**  1.524*** 
  (0.0571)  (0.0277)  (0.571)  (0.335) 
Constant  0.569  1.116***  -17.85***  -11.69*** 
  (0.559)  (0.373)  (4.349)  (2.251) 
         
Observations  399  399  762  762 
R-squared  0.205  0.635  0.418  0.462 
Number of countries  14  14  38  38 
F-test of excluded 
instruments 
 
 
43.26 
47.36
a    102.6 
110.3
a 
Sargan Statistic (P-value)    0.034**    0.010** 
Partial Effect of EIEC with 
rural pop share =  
       
   63% (25
th pctl)  0.072 
(0.054) 
0.041 
(0.070) 
-2.93*** 
(0.552) 
-6.38*** 
(0.662) 
         
   72% (50
th pctl)  0.138** 
(0.047) 
0.213*** 
(0.070) 
-3.059*** 
(0.473) 
-6.09*** 
(0.524) 
         
   85% (75
th pctl)  0.223*** 
(0.066) 
0.437*** 
(0.135) 
-3.226*** 
(0.552) 
-5.71*** 
(0.610) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Excluded instruments for electoral competition: first lag of the average level of electoral 
competition in each country’s neighbors, and dummy variable equal to 1 for years during 
the Cold War. 
a F-test for 1
st-stage regression to predict the interaction term (excluded instruments 
included interaction of rural population share with Cold War dummy). 
 
Table 7.  Effect of Electoral Competition on Agricultural TFP Growth for Crop 
Agriculture in SSA  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS  FE-2SLS 
         
Electoral Comp dummy  1.150**  0.997**  1.285***  1.039*** 
  (0.485)  (0.474)  (0.340)  (0.345) 
Relative Rate of Assistance    1.747***     
    (0.417)     
Log Black Mkt Premium        -0.144*** 
        (0.0387) 
Rural Pop Shr  -0.087***  -0.0569*  -0.195***  -0.195*** 
  (0.0335)  (0.0333)  (0.0152)  (0.0148) 
Year Trend  -0.051**  -0.0573**  -0.101***  -0.107*** 
  (0.0246)  (0.0239)  (0.0157)  (0.0152) 
Civil War Dummy  -0.0400  -0.0432  -0.141  0.0145 
  (0.218)  (0.211)  (0.153)  (0.155) 
Observations  268  268  472  472 
R-squared  0.174  0.223  0.297  0.337 
Number of Countries  11  11  26  26 
Sargan-Hansen (P-value)  .889  0.074*  0.01***  0.01*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald (F-stat)  28.25
a  27.76
a  48.99
a  44.85
a 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded instruments used 
in 1
st stage regressions:  lagged mean level of electoral competition in neighboring countries, 
dummy for Cold War. 
a Exceeds 10% maximal IV size value for Stock-Yogo weak ID test. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 